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11 March 1964

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CENTRAL

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Philippines - Malaysia - Indonesia: The Philippine Government apparently is taking a more independent position in the Malaysia dispute.

Manila's decision to establish consular relations with Malaysia was conveyed in a note of 9 March. Domestic criticism of President Macapagal's pro-Indonesia policy has been growing in recent weeks and Macapagal himself is showing concern over Indonesia's continued belligerence.

Indonesia has not reacted publicly to the Philippine move. Sukarno may have acquiesced to it during Macapagal's state visit to Indonesia last month. Macapagal claims that during this visit he told Sukarno that if no settlement were in sight he would make his separate peace with Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman.

Indonesia meanwhile has announced its intention to recognize the rebel Azahari government of "the North Borneo Unitary State," without specifying when. Sukarno also announced this week that, as a result of the deadlock in the ministerial talks with Malaysia and the Philippines, Indonesia must employ new tactics in a "revolutionary offensive" against Malaysia.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Cambodia: Sihanouk's latest attacks on the US suggest that he may seek closer accommodation with the Communist bloc, although his intentions remain unclear.

*A mob attack against US and UK buildings in Phnom Penh last night apparently was made with the Cambodian government's approval.

Well organized demonstrators ransacked the first floor of the US Embassy and burned out the USIS library before Cambodian police belatedly acted to restore order. Apart from punctuating Sihanouk's recent outbursts against the US, the demonstration indicates that Sihanouk may be planning a rupture in diplomatic relations.

In a speech on 9 March, Sihanouk charged that recent US proposals are aimed at obstructing an international guarantee of Cambodia's neutrality and borders. He threatened to negotiate frontier agreements with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam, "the forces of the future," rather than "Phoumi Nosavan's Laos" or South Vietnam.

Sihanouk has said on other occasions that he would recognize North Vietnam and conclude a military pact with Communist China unless his demands for international guarantees were met.

Sihanouk's verbal assault apparently was held off until he had been further irritated by Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma's refusal, during the latter's visit last week, to recognize formally Cambodia's present boundaries. Sihanouk has long been sensitive to what he regards as the designs of his neighbors on Cambodian territory.

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The military chiefs are said to favor ousting those cabinet ministers who represent the two parties currently in the government. These changes would be aimed at ending the parties' use of official positions and funds for partisan political advantage.

There is also growing dissatisfaction in military circles with two members of the ruling triumvirate. Many officers believe that Ramon Tapia Espinal and Manuel Tavares Espaillat are subject to undue political influence from outside the regime. This may eventually lead the armed forces to back an effort to remove them, leaving the more forceful president of the triumvirate, Donald Reid Cabral, as the sole head of government.

In what seems to be an unrelated development, military leaders apparently are ready to support the return of ex-President Joaquin Balaguer to campaign for the presidency in the election tentatively set for next year. /

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